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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

JASON THOMAS GENOVESI,

:

Case No. 920803-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Jason Thomas Genovesi appeals his conviction
for manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), entered, upon a jury verdict, by the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah,
the Honorable David S. Young, presiding.

This Court has

appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1993) (non-capital, non-first degree felony conviction).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In response to the issues framed by Genovesi, the State
first raises some threshold issues that may be dispositive of
part of his appeal.
I.

The issues addressed in this brief are:

Was there Reversible Error in the Trial Court's

Denial of Genovesi's Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence
Obtained in Two Searches of His Home?

The State divides this

issue into four subissues and alternative issues, as follows:
A.

Has Genovesi Waived His Search and Seizure

Argument, at Least in Part, by Failing to Properly Specify

the Evidence Obtained During the Two Searches?

This issue,

not ruled upon in the trial court, is a question reviewed de
novo by this Court, thus effectively as a matter of law.
B.

Even Assuming that Both Home Searches Were

Improper, Was the Trial Court's Refusal to Suppress the
Evidence Obtained During the Searches Harmless Error?
Again, this is a de novo question, by nature addressed for
the first time on appeal.

For this appeal, the State

accepts the burden of proving harmlessness.

Cf. Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967).
C.

Can this Court Adequately Review the Trial

Court's Denial of Genovesi's Motion to Suppress Evidence,
Even Though the Trial Court Did Not Enter Fully Detailed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law?

The adequacy of

trial court findings, and the consequence of inadequate
findings, is again a question that is determined de novo by
the reviewing appellate court.

See State v. Ramirez, 817

P.2d 774, 786-89 (Utah 1991).
D.

If the Trial Court's Ruling Can be Reviewed on

the Present Record, Did the Trial Court Correctly:
1.

Determine that the First Home Search,

Performed Incident to a Medical Emergency Call to
Genovesi's Home, Was Proper?

Because the trial court

did not formally resolve this question, this Court may
effectively analyze it de novo: the underlying
"predicate facts" are deferentially reviewed, for
2

"clear error."

State v. Vigil. 815 P.2d 1296, 1301

(Utah App. 1991).
2.

Determine that the Second Home Search Was

Proper, Because Supported by the Voluntary Consent of
Genovesifs Wife?

Where consent is not preceded by

illegal police conduct, the determination of
voluntariness is a fact question, reviewed for "clear
error."

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227,

93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
But see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262, 1268-71
(Utah 1993) (apparently broadly holding that question
of voluntary consent, while "primarily a factual
question," is always reviewed on appeal as a matter of
law, without deference to trial court).
II.

Was Defendant's Constitutional Right to an

Impartial Jury Satisfied, Given that His Jury Was Selected from a
Panel Composed Largely of Persons Whose Last Names Begin with the
Letters "S" and »T"?

This appears to be a question of law,

reviewed without deference to the trial court, asking whether
persons with last names beginning with particular letters are
"cognizable groups" for the purpose of "fair cross-section"
analysis, under constitutional guarantees that criminal
defendants shall be tried to impartial juries.

See State v.

Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575-76 (Utah 1987) (declining to hold that
Hispanics are a cognizable group, for sixth amendment purposes,
in Utah); Walker v. Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1990) (per
3

curiam) (persons whose surnames begin with particular letters do
not constitute cognizable groups).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are
practically identical in their language.

The former provision

reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
The text of other constitutional, statutory, and rule provisions
pertinent to this appeal will be set forth as needed in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Genovesi's Statement of the Case (Br. of
Appellant at 6-7) accurately reports that he was tried for murder
(formerly second degree murder), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp.
4

1992), a first degree felony, in connection with the death of his
stepson.

The trial jury convicted Genovesi of the lesser

included offense of manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1990), a second degree felony (R. 220). He was sentenced to a
prison term of one to fifteen years, and fined (R. 224).
Genovesi now appeals, alleging reversible error stemming from two
searches of his home, and in the process by which a panel of
prospective jurors was summoned to serve for his trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Investigation of Death
On the afternoon of March 20, 1992, medical personnel
responded to an emergency "911" call from a home shared by
Genovesi, his wife Lisa, and her two children from a previous
marriage (R. 423-24, 496) . Genovesi, who made the call, had been
at home, in charge of the children, while Mrs. Genovesi was at
work (R. 424-25).

The medical workers found Genovesi kneeling

over his two-year-old stepson, Gavin Adams.

Gavin appeared to be

dead, his neck broken (R. 424, 497-99, 550-54).

Nevertheless,

resuscitation efforts were begun.
Police also responded to the Genovesi emergency, the
first officers arriving while the medical personnel were working
on Gavin (R. 516-18, 561-63).

Officer Kenneth Patrick, who

arrived shortly after Gavin was removed by ambulance, performed a
cursory search of the Genovesi home. He seized a wash cloth that
had been used by Genovesi and the medical personnel, and took
some photographs of the home's interior (R. 242, 245, 249). Upon
5

interviewing Genovesi, Officer Patrick arrested him for child
abuse (R. 10, 249).
The resuscitation efforts failed, and Gavin Adams was
pronounced dead shortly after his arrival at a nearby hospital
(R. 586). The next day, March 21, investigating Gavin's death as
a possible homicide, Officer Patrick telephoned Lisa Genovesi.1
Mrs. Genovesi agreed to allow Patrick into the Genovesi home, to
take measurements and to search for evidence.

Officer Patrick

verified Mrs. Genovesi's permission, restating his intentions at
least once, if not twice (R. 242-44).
Mrs. Genovesi, who was staying elsewhere in the
aftermath of Gavin's death, arranged for a friend to meet Officer
Patrick at her home with the house key, to permit his entry (R.
244-45) . Inside the home, Officer Patrick, assisted by another
officer, took measurements and more photographs--particularly of
a bunk bed from which, according to Genovesi, Gavin had fallen,
causing his fatal injuries.
In the children's bedroom that contained the bunk bed,
the officers observed a dented section of plasterboard wall, with
a piece of hair stuck to it; they seized and preserved the hair
(R. 685-86).

They also cut away and seized, as evidence, the

dented wall section and a section of carpet, also from the
bedroom (R. 245-46, 684-88).

*When this case went to trial, Lisa Genovesi had resumed her
previous last name, Adams (R. 423). She is referred to as "Mrs.
Genovesi" in this brief solely for purposes of clarity.
6

Meanwhile, the autopsy of Gavin Adams confirmed that
his death had been caused by severe head and neck injuries.
Accordingly, the charge against Genovesi was upgraded from child
abuse to murder (R. 6-8).
Pretrial Motions
Before trial, Genovesi moved to suppress all evidence
seized from his home (R. 30, 41-50).

Following an evidentiary

hearing (R. 238-62), the trial court found that "Lisa Genovesi,
the wife of the defendant, did tell Kenneth Patrick, in a 21
March 1992 telephone conversation, that he could go to
defendant's and her residence to search for and collect evidence
pertinent to the death of Gavin Adams."

The motion to suppress

was therefore denied (R. 112-13).
On the date set for trial, the trial court discovered
that of the forty-eight prospective jurors summoned for the case,
all but five had last names beginning with the letters "S" or "T"
(R. 315-17).

The district court's "jury clerk" explained that

this odd pattern resulted from a computer program that randomly
culled "blocks" from the nearly three thousand-member pool of
citizens available for jury service.

The computer had evidently

defined many of its prospective juror "blocks" alphabetically (R.
295-310, T. 3-18 (copied in Addendum IV to Br, of Appellant)).
Defendant objected to the summoned panel.

The trial court,

finding that no constitutionally "recognizable group" had been
eliminated from the panel by the computer's method of summoning

7

jurors, overruled the objection (R. 309-10, T. 17-18 (Addendum IV
to Br. of Appellant)).
Trial
Once the final eight-member jury was seated, trial
spanned three days (R. 404-915).

In exhaustive detail, the

medical examiner who had autopsied Gavin Adams described her
findings (R. 572-680).

Based upon Gavin's serious injuries, and

upon reference to published medical studies, she opined that
Gavin had not died as the result of a fall, as suggested by the
defense.

Rather, the examiner testified, Gavin had died as the

result of homicide (R. 587-88, 624-35).2

The prosecutor

stressed this medical evidence in closing argument (R. 861-63,
871, 900).
The medical examiner also placed the time that Gavin
was injured at five to six hours before death--that is, several
hours before Genovesi placed his "911" call (R. 623). This was
consistent with the observations, by the emergency medical
workers, that Gavin appeared to be beyond resuscitative efforts
when they arrived at the Genovesi home, just minutes after the
"911" call (R. 547, 552). It was inconsistent with Genovesi's
story, told to his wife the next day, that he had "heard a
thump," found Gavin fallen by the bunk bed, and "immediately"
made the "911" call (R. 440).

2

The examiner concluded that Gavin's fatal head and neck
injuries had been caused by "the head being swung or moved forcibly
against a relatively fixed object . . . " (R. 619-20).
8

The "911" call, recorded on tape, was replayed at
trial:

during that call, Genovesi reported that Gavin had fallen

from the bunk bed while playing with his older brother (R. 530,
855, 892).3

To the responding medical personnel and police,

however, Genovesi gave inconsistent accounts:

To some, he

reported that Gavin had fallen from "a crib," not a bunk bed (R.
497, 511-12, 520, 537, 565). The crib, however, was in a
different room, on a different level of the split-level home,
than the bunk bed (R. 565-67).
Genovesi also told the emergency responders that the
older brother had been with him, rather than with Gavin, when
Gavin allegedly fell (R. 520, 716-17).

Genovesi's inconsistent

accounts of what had happened to Gavin were, along with the
medical evidence, also highlighted in the prosecutor's closing
argument (R. 855-56, 860, 867) .
A State's expert witness testified that the hair, found
in the dented section of the home's bedroom wall during the
second search, "could have come" from Gavin's scalp (R. 703-04).
However, during closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged
uncertainties on this question, and on the question of whether
the wall dent had been made by Gavin's head (R. 904-06).4

3

The "911" tape has not been transmitted to the State with the
record on appeal; the recited portion of Genovesi's statement on
the tape is taken from the prosecutor's closing argument.
4

Because the hair found in the wall had been broken off,
rather than pulled out, it contained no hair root tissue for DNA
comparison, which might have allowed a more certain conclusion that
it had come from Gavin's scalp (R. 708).
9

The wash cloth, taken from the Genovesi home on March
20, the day of the emergency call, was not offered into evidence.
Numerous photographs of the home's interior were admitted, but
without differentiation between those taken on March 20, and
those taken March 21, during the search permitted by Mrs.
Genovesi (State's exhibits 5-29, R. 294).
The dented plasterboard wall section and piece of
carpet, seized during the March 21 search, were admitted into
evidence (R. 690-93).

Neither item, as it turned out, was

claimed by the State to be especially probative of its homicide
theory.

Instead, the defense used them heavily, calling expert

witnesses--two engineers, not medical experts--to testify about
elaborate tests they had performed by dropping a bowling ball on
to the piece of carpet, and by swinging a bowling ball and a
dumbbell against a piece of plasterboard similar to that taken
from the Genovesi home (R. 391-96, 780-803, 815-28).

Perhaps

using measurements taken by Officer Patrick (this is not clear),
the engineers used fifty-three inches as the height of the bunk
bed in the Genovesi home (R. 735, 741, 796). The defense thus
attempted to show that Gavin Adams's death could hcive been caused
by a fall from the bunk bed on to the carpeted floor below.5

5

The defense was a bit more detailed than described in the
main text: Genovesi actually attempted to show that Gavin could
have died from a combination of a bathtub fall several days
earlier, which was then compounded by the purported bunk bed fall
(R. 416, 469-71, 890). Main text references to "a fall," as the
defense theory of the cause of Gavin's death, are intended to
encompass both claimed mishaps.
10

Evidently not satisfied that the elements of murder had
been proven, the jury found Genovesi guilty of manslaughter.

He

now appeals, alleging reversible error in the denial of his
pretrial motions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Genovesi failed to fully specify which evidence
was obtained in each of the two separate home searches, he has
effectively waived the opportunity to achieve suppression of some
evidence, on appeal, unless this Court invalidates both searches.
One seized item complained of by Genovesi was not even offered
into evidence, and the propriety of its seizure is therefore a
moot question on appeal.
Even assuming that the trial court should have
suppressed all of the seized evidence from use at trial, the
error in failing to do so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence seized from the Genovesi home was unnecessary to
prove the State's case.

Genovesi was convicted on the strength

of overwhelming evidence, unrelated to any possible impropriety
in the two home searches, that Gavin Adams did not die in an
accident, but because of an assault by Genovesi.
The testimony supporting the denial of Genovesi#s
pretrial motion to suppress evidence was uncontradicted and
internally consistent.

The only pertinent, unaddressed factual

issue, involving the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's consent to the
second home search, can be conceded by the State for this appeal.
Therefore, this Court can review the denial of Genovesi's
11

suppression motion on the present record, and need not remand the
issue for a more detailed trial court ruling.
Genovesi's motion to suppress was properly denied.

The

first search was conducted incident to Genovesi's emergency call,
and incident to his arrest, also made at that time.

The search

was cursory in nature, and properly limited in scope to the
exigency that prompted it.

The trial court's ruling that the

second search was authorized by voluntary consent was correct,
for there is no inkling that Mrs. Genovesi's consent was obtained
by coercion.

The consent probably did not contemplate the

physical cutting away of parts of the home.

However, the trial

court's refusal to suppress the pieces of wall and carpet seized
in this manner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

those

items were wholly insignificant as State's evidence.
Genovesi's motion to strike the summoned jury panel was
also properly denied.

Genovesi fails to show systematic

exclusion of any properly "cognizable" or "distinctive" groups
from the jury panel.

His argument that such groups can be

defined solely from the first letters of their surnames has been
squarely rejected by the other courts that have considered it.
The panel reflected the broad range of relevant citizen
backgrounds, and was therefore a proper, "fair cross-section"
source for the selection of Genovesi's trial jury.

12

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF GENOVESI'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
Introduction
Genovesi requests reversal of the trial court's denial
of his motion to suppress evidence, which was founded upon his
allegation that both the March 20 and 21 home searches violated
constitutional search and seizure principles.

The March 20

search, he argues, went beyond the scope of what was permissible
incident to his "911" call.

He then argues that the March 21

search was not supported by legally adequate, voluntary consent,
and that it also exceeded the proper scope contemplated by Mrs.
Genovesi's consent.
Before proceeding to the issues framed by Genovesi, the
State raises two threshold issues.

Considered in tandem, these

two issues permit rejection of Genovesi's search and seizure
argument altogether.
A.

Genovesi's Nonspecific Motion to Suppress Impedes
his Claim to Appellate Relief.
The State's first threshold issue involves Genovesi's

inadequate specification of the precise relief sought.

Genovesi

has not, either in the trial court or on appeal, ever fully
specified which items of evidence were seized during the March 20
search, as opposed to the March 21 search.

In fact, his written

motion to suppress, challenging "the warrantless search," only
addressed the latter search (R. 30, 41-49, copied in Appendix I
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of this brief).

Genovesi did not challenge the March 20 search

until the hearing on his motion to suppress (R. 253).
As follows, such lack of specificity causes problems
for Genovesi.

If he proves that only one of the two searches was

improper, only some uncertain portion of all the seized evidence
will be subject to the exclusionary rule.

There is also one

item, apparently assailed by Genovesi as wrongfully seized, that
was never offered into evidence, and therefore is not a proper
subject for this appeal.
1.

Photographs: When Taken?

Twenty-five interior photographs of the Genovesi home
were admitted at Genovesi's trial (State's exhibits 5-29, R.
294).

Photos were taken during both the March 20 and 21

searches, but nothing in the record ties any of the photos
admitted at trial to a specific search date.

It seems likely

that some of the photos were taken during each of the two
searches.
Therefore, if only one of the two searchers is ruled
improper on appeal, only the photos taken during that search are
subject to suppression, while photos taken during the other,
proper search remain admissible.

This leaves a problem:

of the photos are to be suppressed?

which

In short, Genovesi has not

specified the precise relief due to him if only one search was
improper.

But as the movant for suppression of evidence, such

specification has always been his duty.

See Utah R. Crim. P.

12(a) (a pretrial motion "shall state with particularity the
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grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief
sought").
Accordingly, if this Court holds that only one of the
searches was improper, it should deem the prospect of suppressing
photographs taken during such search to be waived.

See Utah R.

Crim. P. 12(d) (failure to make timely request constitutes waiver
thereof).

Put another way, unless Genovesi convinces this Court

that both searches were improper, he cannot achieve suppression
of any of the photographs that were admitted at his trial.
2.

Wash Cloth:

Mootness

While complaining about the seizure of a wash cloth
during the March 20 search (Br. of Appellant at 10), Genovesi
neglects to mention that this item was neither offered nor
admitted into evidence at trial. Therefore, the question of
whether the wash cloth should have been suppressed has no bearing
on his criminal prosecution.6

As such, that question is moot,

and under Rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it
should not be addressed.

Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44

(Utah 1989) (question is moot where its resolution cannot affect
the litigants' rights).
3.

Hair, Piece of Wall, Piece of Carpet.

The record does show that the hair that "could have
come" from Gavin Adams's head, the dented section of wall in
which the hair was found, and the section of carpet were all
6

If the wash cloth was unreasonably seized, Genovesi's remedy
would simply be that it be returned, or if not returned, that he be
compensated for its loss.
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seized during the March 21 search.

These items will be addressed

at the appropriate points in this brief,
B.

Even if Genovesi's Motion to Suppress Was
Erroneously Denied in All Aspects, Such Error Was
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
This Court does not need to sort out Genovesi's vague,

nonspecific motion to suppress.

Instead, it can decline to

address the propriety of either of the two challenged searches.
As its second threshold issue, dispositive of Genovesi's search
and seizure arguments, the State submits that any error in the
admission of the seized evidence, against Genovesi's pretrial
motion to suppress, was harmless.
For purposes of this analysis, this Court may assume,
without deciding, that both searches of Genovesi's home were
improper, and that all evidence obtained during those searches
should have been suppressed.

Even so assuming, Genovesi's

conviction need not be reversed for the failure to suppress that
evidence at his trial.
1.

Reasons for Harmless Error Analysis.

Harmless error analysis is, of course, a legitimate and
venerable approach to trial errors involving procedural and
evidentiary rules.

E.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid.

103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless error rules mandating that
trial errors that do not affect "substantial rights" shall be
disregarded).

See generally State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-22

(Utah 1989); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987)
(discussing harmless error).

Such analysis serves the beneficial
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purpose of avoiding needlessly duplicative new trials, thereby
conserving trial court resources:
[I]f the fabled "day in court" is permitted
casually to multiply into twenty days in court,
the inevitable consequence is that, by the
inexorable law of mathematics, nineteen other
litigants are denied any court time at all, save
only the few moments required for the tendering of
their negotiated pleas.
Davis v. State, 611 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Md. App.), cert, granted,
616 A.2d 1286 (Md. 1992).

New trials, for errors that had no

discernible impact upon the original trial, also subject
litigants and witnesses to needless inconvenience, expense, and,
in cases like this one, repetition of trauma and heartache.
Consistent with such concerns, the federal Supreme
Court has squarely endorsed harmless error analysis even for
errors that are constitutional in dimension.

See Chambers v.

Maronev. 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1982 (1970)
(upholding conviction where possibly erroneous admission of
evidence under the fourth amendment was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); compare Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S.
543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968) ("Because the [improperly
seized] rifle was plainly damaging evidence . . . its admission
at the trial was not harmless error").
Fulminante, 499 U.S.

,

See also Arizona v.

, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263-64 (1991);

Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-79, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3105-06
(1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-84, 106 S. Ct.
1431, 1434-1438 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 2124, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28 (1967) (all discussing harmless
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constitutional error).

So ruling, the Court has observed that

reversal of convictions for constitutional error, even when such
error is inconsequential to the trial verdict, "encourages
litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to
ridicule it." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. at 577, 106 S. Ct. at
3105; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S. Ct. at 1436 (both
quoting and approving R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50
(1970)).

Accord Fulminante. Ill S. Ct. at 1264 (harmless error

doctrine "promotes public respect for the criminal process by
focusing on the underlying fairness of trial rather than on the
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error" (quoting Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S. Ct at 1436)).
Further, a trial court's failure to suppress wrongfully
seized evidence is not constitutional error in and of itself.
Rather, suppression under the "exclusionary rule" is simply a
judicially created remedy for improper searches and seizures.
United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620
(1974).

See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 473 (Utah 1990)

(two-justice plurality opinion invoking exclusionary rule under
article I, section 14, without deciding whether the rule is
constitutionally required:

"We simply hold that it exists");

contra State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 484-85, 220 P. 704, 708 (1923)
(unanimously rejecting exclusionary rule under article I, section
14).

Nor does the possibly erroneous denial of a suppression

motion amount to a "structural defect" in the ensuing trial.
Instead, as with evidentiary admissibility rulings in general,
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such error is the kind of error that can be "quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented" for its
actual impact upon the trial.

See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at

,

111 S. Ct. at 1263 (explaining that structural errors are those
that call the fairness of trial itself into question).
Indeed, in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d
639 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court, consistent with the federal
approach, endorsed a harmlessness analysis even for errors that
are constitutional in magnitude:
We think the correct view, and the one which is
both practical and in keeping with the desired
objective of fundamental fairness and due process
of law, is that there is a presumption that
[constitutional] error is prejudicial, but that it
can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that it had no such prejudicial
effect upon the proceedings. Correlative to this
it is also true that when the guilt is shown by
other untainted evidence so overwhelming that
there is no likelihood whatsoever of a different
result in the absence of such error or
irregularity, there should be no reversal.
24 Utah 2d at 208, 648 P.2d at 643 (footnotes omitted).

So

holding, the Utah court approved the policy of avoiding
"unnecessary proliferation of legal proceedings."

Id.

Harmless error analysis has also been at least tacitly
approved under the Utah Constitution.

The Scandrett opinion did

not distinguish between federal and state constitutional error.
However, there is no reason to believe that Scandrett was
intended to make the analysis available only in cases of federal
error, given that the same policy considerations apply under both
constitutions.

Indeed, post-Scandrett Utah Supreme Court
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opinions do not question the availability of harmless error
analysis under the state constitution.

Rather, they merely

express reservation about the form of such analysis.

See State

v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989); State v. Hackford.
737 P.2d 200, 205 n.3 (Utah 1987).
In sum, this Court can confidently hold that harmless
error analysis is permitted in reviewing allegedly erroneous
denial of motions to suppress, under both the fourth amendment
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The only

question is how to apply the analysis.
2.

Parameters of the Harmless Error Analysis.

The State answers that question by voluntarily assuming
a heavy burden.

Chapman, endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court in

the above-quoted passage from Scandrett. places the burden upon
the State to demonstrate that a constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.7

386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.

Even though an erroneous failure to apply the exclusionary rule
is not itself a constitutional error, the State shoulders the
burden of proving harmlessness in this case.

7

The error in Chapman lay in permitting the prosecutor to
comment at length upon the defendants' decision to not testify at
their trial. 386 U.S. at 19-20, 87 S. Ct. at 825-26.
The State reserves its prerogative, in some future case, to
argue that harmless error analysis, applied to the allegedly
erroneous failure to apply the exclusionary remedy for search and
seizure violations, might proceed differently--perhaps even with
the burden of demonstrating trial-level harm placed upon the
defendant. Chambers v. Maroney and Bumper v. North Carolina do not
appear to allocate the burden of persuasion in this context.
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To show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the
State adapts the test set forth in Van Arsdall, a case that
involved the erroneous denial of the defendant's confrontation
rights at trial. Modified to fit the exclusionary rule error
alleged in this case, the State first examines the challenged
evidence for its importance to the prosecution.

The overall

strength of the State's case, independent from that evidence, is
then be examined.
1438.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S. Ct. at

This "overwhelming evidence" analysis is identical to that

set forth in Scandrett, quoted above, where the at-trial
admissibility of an accused's statements to police was in issue.
As just mentioned, the Utah Supreme Court has expressed
reservation about how to apply harmless error analysis under the
state constitution.

In Hackford, 737 P.2d at 205 n.3, the court

asserted that the Van Arsdall "overwhelming evidence" test of
harmless error is more lenient than the earlier formulation in
Chapman, which states:

"The question is whether there is a

reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction."

386 U.S. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827

(quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229,
230 (1963)).

But strictly read, that formulation would make

harmless constitutional error analysis--specifically endorsed in
Chapman and Scandrett--impossible to satisfy.
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The "overwhelming

evidence" test relaxes the standard just enough to make harmless
error analysis viable in constitutional error situations.8
The modern "overwhelming evidence" test of harmless
error is especially appropriate in this case, given that the
exclusionary rule violation asserted by Genovesi is not itself of
constitutional magnitude.

In shouldering the burden of

persuasion under the overwhelming evidence test, the State will
further obey the caveat very recently set forth by the federal
Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Louisiana,

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct.

2078 (1993):
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the
basis on which "the jury actually rested its
verdict." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.
,
[,
111 S. Ct. 1884,
] (1991) (emphasis added).
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in
this trial was actually attributable to the error.
113 S. Ct. at 2081.
Under these parameters, the State's Van Arsdall and
Scandrett-based harmless error analysis is stringent yet
8

In the context of a confrontation clause violation, as
happened in Van Arsdall, the Utah Supreme Court noted criticism of
the "overwhelming evidence" analysis. Defense-favoring evidence
that might have been gleaned through confrontation and cross
examination may be not known on appeal.
An appellate court,
reviewing the error for harmlessness, therefore may indulge in
excessive speculation about the content of the denied evidence, and
may also deny the defendant's jury trial right, by ruling upon
evidence that has not been placed before a jury. See Hackford, 737
P.2d at 205 n.3, and The Supreme Court, 1985 Term--Leading Cases,
100 Harvard L. Rev. 100, 115-16 (1986), cited therein.
Such
problem is not present in this case, for Genovesi only complains of
evidence that was admitted, and is therefore known on appeal: he
has no complaint that he was denied his fair right to "confront"
the State's evidence, or to elicit his own evidence.
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realistic:

it should satisfy both federal and state

constitution-based requirements.

Under it, Genovesi's guilty

verdict, like that of the accused in Chambers v. Maroney, is
attributable to overwhelming evidence that, without dispute, was
properly admitted--and not to evidence obtained during the
challenged home searches.
3.

Application of Harmless Error Analysis.

Because the wash cloth seized during the March 20
search was not offered into evidence, it will not be addressed.
The State's harmless error analysis addresses the following,
actually admitted evidence:

the interior photographs and

measurements of the Genovesi home; the hair taken from the dented
plasterboard wall; the dented wall piece removed from the home;
the piece of carpet removed from the home.

Compared to other,

overwhelming State's evidence, the admission of these items was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Photographs and Measurements
Several of the home photos show the bunk bed from
which, under the defense theory, Gavin Adams may have fallen,
causing his injuries (State's exhibits 24-27, admitted at R452).

One or two photos show the dented wall (State's exhibits

27 and 28, admitted at R. 452). Apparently based on measurements
taken by police, the jury learned the height of the bunk bed, and
the height of the dent in the home's wall (R. 741, 692-92A).
None of this evidence was especially probative of any pertinent
trial fact. Arguably, much of this evidence might have been
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excluded as irrelevant, cumulative, or time-wasting, Utah R.
Evid. 401, 402, 403, had Genovesi raised such objection.
Hair
As things developed at trial, the hair found in the
wall dent only "could have" come from Gavin Adams's head; its
origin was not certain.

The prosecutor conceded as much in his

closing argument to the jury (R. 905). Thus the broken-off
strand of hair held negligible value, if any, for the purpose of
proving Genovesi's guilt.
Dented Piece of Wall
This item also proved unhelpful to the State's case.
It was "almost certain," the prosecutor admitted to the jury,
that Gavin Adams's head injury had not been caused by being
struck against the wall (R. 863, 904-06).

Further, Genovesi

himself, through his own expert witnesses, described elaborate
tests on a similar piece of plasterboard (R. 395-96, 815-28).
Those tests were evidently designed to show that Gavin's skull
had not been fractured against the wall--a possibility that,
again, the State conceded.

Such concession, however, in no way

ruled out numerous other hard surfaces against which Gavin could
have been battered, causing his death:

it was unnecessary, as an

element of murder or manslaughter, to prove the exact method and
place of Gavin's death.
Piece of Carpet
The carpet was heavily relied upon by Genovesi, rather
than by the State. Again through his expert witnesses, Genovesi
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attempted to show that Gavin Adams's fatal injuries could have
been caused by a fall from the bunk bed, on to the carpeted
floor, rather than by Genovesi's hands (R. 392-95, 780-803).

As

State's evidence, the piece of carpet was needless for proving
Genovesi's guilt.
Independent Strength of State's Case
Independent, properly-received State's evidence was
overwhelmingly probative of Genovesi's guilt.

The medical

examiner's testimony, by itself, soundly defeated the defense
theory that Gavin Adams had died from an accidental fall.
Gavin's injuries, the examiner testified, were far too severe to
support that theory (R. 587-88, 624-35).

This evidence was

stressed to the jury (R. 861-63, 871, 900). Indeed, as a matter
of common experience, the likelihood that a simple, in-home fall
could cause Gavin's severe head and neck injuries appears
vanishingly remote.
Independent evidence also showed that the defense
theory of an accidental fall was inconsistent with Genovesi's
"911" call, which was taken by emergency responders to suggest a
fresh accident:

instead, Gavin appeared dead beyond

resuscitation to the responding medical personnel (R. 498). The
jury learned that in all likelihood, Gavin had suffered his fatal
injuries several hours before Genovesi placed the emergency call
(R. 623) . These inconsistencies supported a powerful inference
that no accident caused those injuries, but that instead, Gavin
was physically battered by Genovesi; then, in the vain hope that
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Gavin's injuries were not serious, Genovesi waited several hours
before summoning help, and fabricated the "fall" report.
Further inconsistencies in the defense theory were also
powerfully telling.

These included Genovesi's varying accounts,

to emergency responders and police, about where and how the
"fall" suffered by Gavin had occurred, and about the location of
Gavin's brother when that "accident" happened (R. 497, 511-12,
520, 530, 537, 565-67, 855, 892).
Quite independently of the evidence that Genovesi moved
to suppress, then, the trial jury had ample and far more powerful
evidence that Genovesi killed Gavin Adams.

This Court should

therefore hold that even if the trial court erroneously denied
Genovesi's motion to suppress, such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Upon such holding, Genovesi's request for

reversal of his conviction, under the constitutional search and
seizure errors he alleges, should be denied.
C.

The Trial Court's Denial of Genovesi's Motion
to Suppress Can be Adequately Reviewed On the
Present Record.
If this Court does not find harmless error in the

admission of evidence obtained during both home searches, it must
address the arguments advanced by Genovesi.

The State now

responds to those arguments.
Genovesi first argues that the trial court entered
inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, underpinning
its denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his
home.

The assailed "Findings and Order" (R. 112-13) are copied
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in Addendum I to Genovesi's Brief of Appellant.

Genovesi argues

that this short written ruling does not permit meaningful
appellate review, and that this case "must be remanded" for
adequate findings and conclusions (Br. of Appellant at 14).
The trial court's written ruling is inadequate in that
it omits any mention of the March 20 search.

(However, that

inadequacy is due, at least in part, to Genovesi's failure to
specify a challenge to that search in his written suppression
motion.)

The trial court's ruling is minimally adequate in its

treatment of the March 21 search.

Nevertheless, the fair

interpretation of the ruling is that the trial court found the
second search to have been conducted under the authority of Mrs.
Genovesi's valid--i.e., voluntary--consent.
The shortcomings in the trial court's ruling do not
require a remand.

The ruling was issued nearly two weeks before

trial began (R. 113, 292), giving Genovesi ample time to object
to its shortcomings in the trial court.

No such objection

appears in the record, and the failure to raise it constitutes
its waiver now, on appeal.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) ("Failure

of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial . . . shall
constitute waiver thereof . . . " ) .
Even overlooking the waiver, this Court need not remand
the suppression question for a more detailed trial court ruling.
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court explained that the failure to enter detailed findings of
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fact and conclusions of law does not always require reversal or
remand.

Instead, appellate courts will uphold a trial court's

ruling whenever the record supports a presumption that the proper
underlying factual findings were made.

817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6.

Such a presumption is supported when the prevailing party's
evidence is internally consistent, not self-contradictory or in
conflict.

See id. at 787 (police officers' testimony was in

conflict, necessitating remand).9
In this case, the trial court's denial of Genovesi's
motion to suppress was supported by consistent State's evidence.
The sole witness at the motion hearing was Officer Patrick.
While acknowledging that the March 20 search was conducted
without explicit consent, Patrick also described the search as
cursory, limited to taking some photographs and the seizure of a
wash cloth.

No evidence contradicts this description.

The manner in which Officer Patrick obtained Mrs.
Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search was also
uncontradicted:

Patrick told Mrs. Genovesi of his wish to "take

measurements and search for evidence" (R. 242) . Mrs. Genovesi
was not told that she was required to comply with Patrick's
request, nor was she threatened.

Mrs. Genovesi facilitated

Patrick's entry into the home, by sending a friend to meet him
there with a key (R. 244-45).
9

Ramirez trumps this Court's prior suggestions on this
question, e.g., State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n.ll (Utah
App. 1990), and State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (cited in Br. of Appellant
at 14) .
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There is only a single factual matter of note that was
not addressed by the trial court.

That is the question of

whether Mrs. Genovesi's search consent, even though freely and
voluntarily given, necessarily included permission for Officer
Patrick to cut away and remove the dented wall section and a
piece of carpet from the home.

Neither Genovesi nor the State

presented evidence, at the hearing of the motion to suppress, on
this "scope-of-consent" issue.

For the purpose of this appeal,

however, the State concedes that Mrs. Genovesi's consent, as
recounted in the present record, did not contemplate that pieces
of the home itself would be collected by Officer Patrick.
This Court is therefore presented with a trial court
ruling that implicitly upheld the March 20 search of the Genovesi
home, presumably by finding that search, on Officer Patrick's
uncontroverted testimony, to be cursory in nature.

The ruling

explicitly upheld the March 21 search, presumably on a finding,
also on uncontroverted evidence, that Mrs. Genovesi voluntarily
consented to at least so much of the search as did not include
the removal of the wall and carpet pieces.

So clarified, the

trial court's ruling can be reviewed on the present record.
D.

Genovesi's Challenges to the Two Home
Searches Were, for the Most Part, Correctly
Denied.
1.

The March 20 Search.

The home search on March 20 was proper.

Police entered

the Genovesi home that day in response to Genovesi's call for
emergency assistance.

"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar
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police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when
they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of
immediate aid."

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct.

2408, 2413 (1978).

Genovesi's "911" call, inasmuch as it

requested immediate aid for Gavin Adams, clearly operated to
permit a police entry into his home.
Further, once the dire nature of Gavin's injuries was
known, there was probable cause to arrest Genovesi.

The first-

arriving responders quickly ascertained that Gavin's neck
appeared broken (R. 501). In light of such a severe injury,
reasonable officers could readily determine that Genovesi's claim
of an accidental fall rang false, and suspect him as the likely
true cause of Gavin's injuries. At that moment, Genovesi was
legally subject to arrest; indeed, he was arrested (R. 249). A
limited search of the immediate premises, incident to his arrest,
was then permissible.

See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-

85 (Utah App.) (citing authorities), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).

Such a search was permissible even though it may

have preceded, rather than followed, Genovesi's actual, formal
arrest.

Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S. Ct. 2556,

2564 (1980) .
With the foregoing bases for a warrantless search
established, the remaining question is whether the March 20
search was properly limited in scope.

See Mincey, 437 U.S. at

393, 98 S. Ct. at 2413. There aire several components to this
"scope" inquiry.
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First, the search occurred during a continuous police
presence in the Genovesi home--a presence that began before
emergency medical workers removed the injured Gavin Adams.
Genovesi inaccurately asserts that no officers arrived until
after emergency medical workers removed Gavin (Br. of Appellant
at 10). While testimony at the hearing of Genovesi's motion to
suppress does suggest this (R. 248-49), trial testimony shows
that at least two police officers, Kendra Herlin and Steve
Winters, entered the home before Gavin was removed (R. 516-18,
561-63).

Officer Patrick, who conducted the search, arrived

after Gavin was removed, but while Officer Herlin was still
present (R. 240-41).

This undercuts Genovesi's apparent

allegation that officers entered his home only after Gavin was
removed, and used false "emergency" authority to conduct the
March 20 search.
Next, Genovesi at least implicitly contends that once
the scene was secured, and all occupants of his home accounted
for, Officer Patrick could not make any further intrusion without
explicit consent, or a search warrant (Br. of Appellant at 10; R.
248).

While not spelling it out, Mincey clearly supports such a

rule.

437 U.S. at 393-95, 98 S. Ct. at 2413-15.

Similarly, it

cannot be surely said that the two bedrooms entered by Officer
Patrick as the purported site of Gavin's "accident" were
necessarily within Genovesi's immediate control, for the purpose
of the "search incident to arrest" rule.
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In Harrison, however,

this Court took note of the rather elastic definition of the area
within an arrestee's "immediate control."

805 P.2d at 784.

Under both the "emergency" and "incident to arrest"
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the textual constitutional
limitation, under both the fourth amendment and article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, is reasonableness.

A

reasonableness-based approach to the March 20 search is proper,
even acknowledging, as did Officer Patrick, that the immediate
emergency had diminished when he arrived at the Genovesi home (R.
248).

It is also proper even if the search does not perfectly

fit the judicially-defined limits of an emergency scene search or
a search incident to arrest.

In a post-Mincey opinion, the

Supreme Court held that "[t]he reasonableness of any particular
governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on
the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means."

Illinois

v. Lafavette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610 (1983).
Thus even if Officer Patrick might be criticised for failing to
more strictly circumscribe the March 20 search, such criticism
ought not render that search unreasonable per se.10
Under these principles, Officer Patrick's March 20
search of the Genovesi home, incident to the emergency call, was
reasonably limited in scope, even if not perfectly so. No
10

A prompt inspection of the premises, as occurred here, was
not appropriate solely to assure safety and perhaps discover
incriminating evidence. It was also important, and potentially
beneficial, as a means to possibly corroborate G€*novesi's claim
that Gavin Adams had been injured in an accidental fall.
A
flexible standard of reasonableness, as permitted in Lafayette, is
therefore appropriate.
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evidence contradicts Patrick's characterization of that search as
"very preliminary, cursory" (R. 248) . In an attempt to confirm
or dispel Genovesi's report that Gavin Adams had been injured in
a fall, Patrick merely entered the two rooms variously described
by Genovesi as the site of Gavin's "fall," and took some
photographs (R. 249). The only item physically seized was the
wash cloth—again, not pertinent to this appeal.
Officer Patrick's cursory investigation pales in
comparison to the "exhaustive and intrusive" four-day,
warrantless apartment search that was condemned in Mincey, 437
U.S. at 389, 98 S. Ct. at 2411.X1

Patrick's initial search of

the Genovesi home was reasonably commensurate in scope to the
emergency situation that prompted it, and also to the scope of a
search incident to Genovesi's arrest. Although not perfect, the
March 20 search should be deemed permissible.
2.

March 21 Search.

The trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Genovesi
voluntarily consented to the second home search, on March 21.12
Genovesi agrees that his wife had authority to consent to the
1111

[T] he entire apartment was searched, photographed, and
diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cupboards,
and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they
dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; they pulled up
sections of the carpet and removed them for examination. Every
item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and 200
to 300 objects were seized.
In short, Mincey's apartment was
subjected to an exhaustive and intrusive search." 437 U.S. at 389,
98 S. Ct. at 2411.
"There were no exigent circumstances to justify the March 21
search. Cf. Br. of Appellant at 37. For that second search, the
State relies solely upon consent.
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search (Br, of Appellant at 17, citing State v. Elder, 815 P.2d
1341, 1343 (Utah App. 1991), and federal authority).

He argues,

however, that his wife did not give her consent voluntarily, and
that Patrick exceeded the scope of the consent that was given.
The State addresses, in turn, Genovesi's arguments under the
fourth amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

It then turns to the "scope of consent" question

regarding the March 21 search.
Fourth Amendment
Under federal law, "the question of whether a consent
to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress
or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041,
2047-48 (1973) (emphasis added); accord State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65, 82 (Utah App. 1990) ("We deferentially review a trial court's
finding of voluntary consent, . . . disturbing it only if the
appellant demonstrates that there has been clear error").
However, in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court rejected this precedent, and applied a "twostandard" appellate approach to the voluntary consent question.
Under that approach, the appellate court defers only to the trial
court's findings of underlying "subsidiary" facts, and reserves
the "voluntariness" determination, derived from those facts, as a
nondeferentially-reviewed legal matter.
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846 P.2d at 1270-71.

Under either standard of appellate review, adequate
evidence supports the trial court's ruling that Mrs. Genovesi
voluntarily consented to the March 21 search.

In seeking the

consent, Officer Patrick explained his intentions to Mrs.
Genovesi at least twice (R. 242-44) . She, in turn, facilitated
his entry, by dispatching a friend with the house key to meet
Officer Patrick (R. 244-45).

This evidence reveals no claim by

Patrick that he already had authority to search the Genovesi
home; nor does it suggest the use of force, deception, or trick
to obtain the consent.13

Instead, it reveals that Patrick made

a request, with which Mrs. Genovesi willingly cooperated.

See

State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (listing
factors to be considered in voluntary consent determination).
Patrick's wholly uncontradicted testimony is also sufficiently
"clear and positive" to overcome the "presumption against the
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights," set by this Court
in Webb, 790 P.2d at 82.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
Although article I, section 14 is virtually identical
in text to the fourth amendment, Genovesi urges a divergent
analysis of the consent question under this state constitutional
provision.

He argues that a "Miranda-type warning," advising a

person of his or her right to refuse, and the consequences of

"Compare Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.
Ct. 1788, 1791 (1968) (valid consensual search not possible where
"consent" was given in response to police officer's unsubstantiated
claim that he had a warrant).
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granting consent, should be given whenever a search consent is
sought (Br. of Appellant at 21-22 & n.14).

In Schneckloth. 412

U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2048, the United States Supreme Court
squarely rejected this argument under the fourth amendment.
Defendant invites this Court to depart from this long-settled
federal approach, and make the "Miranda-type warning" a "sine qua
non" for finding, upon judicial review, that a search consent was
valid under article I, section 14 (Br. of Appellant at 21).
This Court should decline defendant's invitation.

As

the Utah Supreme Court has explained, state constitution-based
departures from federal law "may be an appropriate method for
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given the fourth amendment by the
federal courts."
1988).

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah

However, there has been no inconsistency in federal court

adherence, as commanded in Schneckloth, to the "totality of the
circumstances" approach to examining the voluntariness of a
search consent.

That analytical approach has also been embraced

by both Utah appellate courts.

See Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106

("the prosecution is not required to prove that defendant knew of
his right to refuse consent . . . " ) ; State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d
133, 137 (Utah App. 1991).
Further, other states to consider this question under
their state constitutions have overwhelmingly opted to maintain
the "totality of the circumstances" approach, wherein the
"Miranda-type warning" is significant, but not dispositive, for
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showing voluntary consent.

E.g., People v. Havhurst, 571 P.2d

721, 724 n.4 (Colo. 1977); State v. Christofferson, 610 P.2d 515,
517 (Idaho 1980); State v. Stemple, 646 P.2d 539, 541 (Mont.
1982); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977); Frink v.
State, 597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d
386, 389 (Ark. 1977); State v. Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H.
1979); State v. Rodgers. 349 N.W.2d 453, 459 (Wis. 1984).
Against this widespread adherence to the "totality" approach,
Genovesi advances only State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J.
1975), and Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983).
Recently, in State v. Singleton, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
(Utah App. 1993), this Court rejected a similar overture to
depart from fourth amendment search and seizure analysis, in the
context of a challenge to a search warrant.

So doing, this Court

rejected a strict "informant reliability" approach to the
issuance of search warrants--previously discarded under the
fourth amendment, and embraced a "totality of the circumstances"
standard under the Utah Constitution.

214 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33.

The Court found "no reason" to depart from the settled,
federally-originated "totality" approach.14
14

Id.

The Singleton panel also rejected the appellant's historical
reference to the "unique circumstances" of Utah history. 214 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 33. Genovesi raises a similar historical argument in
this case, observing that Utah's white settlers, because they
practiced "slavery and polygamy," often found themselves in
conflict with federal authorities (Br. of Appellant at 28). It is
difficult, at best, to justify expansive search and seizure
protections on the rationale that the settlers ran into trouble for
practices that are now both widely disapproved and constitutionally
forbidden. U.S. Const. Amend. XIII (slavery prohibited); Utah
Const. Art. Ill, para. 1 ("polygamous or plural marriages are
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The identically-named, federal approach to consent
voluntariness appropriately recognizes that there is no
"infallible touchstone" for determining voluntariness.
Instead, the "totality" inquiry appropriately examines both the
police conduct and the subjective state of mind of the person who
is alleged to have consented.
S. Ct. at 2048-49.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93

Further, rejecting a strict "Miranda-type

warning" or "waiver" approach to search consents in Schneckloth,
the Supreme Court observed that in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), the "inherently coercive" nature of
custodial interrogation--that is, police questioning of an
arrestee--was the driving concern behind establishment of the
"Miranda warning" requirement.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 240, 93

S. Ct. at 2054.
In this case, because Mrs. Genovesi was not in police
custody when she consented to the March 21 search, the main
concern underlying Miranda was absent.

Nor were concerns about

Mrs. Genovesi's fifth and sixth amendment protections against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel particularly
important.

Those concerns, which also animated Miranda, were of

greatly diminished importance in this case, given that Mrs.
Genovesi was not an "accused" person, U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI,
Utah Const. Art. I § 12, at the time consent was sought.
Genovesi therefore seeks to extend, to law governing
consensual searches, policy considerations that have never been a
forever prohibited").
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part of that law.

See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241, 93 S. Ct. at

2055 ("There is a vast difference between those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment").

See also American Fork City v. Croscrrove.

701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353,
358 (Utah 1980), and State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324, 1325 (Utah
1976) (all holding that Utah's constitutional self-incrimination
provision, Art. I § 12, does not bar physical evidence, but only
coerced testimony or statements).

That extension, rejected

overwhelmingly under other state constitutions, and in conflict
with settled, albeit federally-based, search and seizure law in
Utah, should not be undertaken.

Instead, this Court should hold

that Mrs. Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search was
voluntary, under both the federal and Utah constitutions.
Scope of Consent
The final search and seizure question is whether the
March 21 search was conducted within the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's
consent.

See State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 692 (Utah 1991),

Grovier, 808 P.2d at 137, and State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
888 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)
(searches that exceed scope of consent are unconstitutional). On
this question, the trial court erred in part, but harmlessly.
Reasonably viewed, Mrs. Genovesi's consent included
permission to take photographs, and to make measurements in the
home.

These activities, not interfering with property rights,

and of which Mrs. Genovesi was clearly informed, were not even
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constitutionally-defined "seizures."

See Arizona v. Hicks, 480

U.S. 321, 324, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (1987) (conduct that does
not "meaningfully interfere" with possessory interests is not a
seizure).

The piece of hair was reasonably seized from the

dented wall, inasmuch as nobody would reasonably assert an
ongoing possessory interest in such an item.

It was also well

within the reasonable scope of Officer Patrick's request, to Mrs.
Genovesi, that he wished to "go into the house and take
measurements and search for evidence" (R. 242-44).
Under the established facts, however, the State cannot
justify Officer Patrick's removal of the wall and carpet sections
from the home.

He might have received permission to do this, had

he made such a request to Mrs. Genovesi.

But he made no such

request, and nothing else in the record indicates that such
dismantling of the home itself, even if minimal, was either
contemplated by Mrs. Genovesi, or might reasonably be considered
a normal part of a home search.
Cutting away pieces of wall and carpet is qualitatively
different from, say, temporarily removing an automobile heater
hose, as was done in Grovier, 808 P.2d at 134-35, or unscrewing a
home electrical fixture, to peer inside.

Obviously, pieces of

wall and carpet cannot be quickly replaced with the same tools
used to remove them, as can the latter items.

On the facts of

record, the wall and carpet sections were unreasonably seized,
and were erroneously admitted into evidence.
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To affirm Genovesi's conviction despite the foregoing
error, the State is therefore compelled to upon a harmless error
analysis.

As set forth earlier in this brief, all the evidence

obtained in the Genovesi home was harmlessly admitted, for
Genovesi was convicted upon far more powerful evidence, unrelated
to any police misconduct.

Even if this Court does not accept

that argument in its entirety, it should accept its application
to the wall and carpet sections.
Again, the prosecutor acknowledged, to the jury, strong
doubts about the probative value of the wall section. Again,
Genovesi, not the State, heavily utilized the carpet section as
trial evidence.

Accordingly, beyond a reasonable doubt, these

two items did not contribute to Genovesi's conviction:
was sealed by other, far more powerful evidence.

his fate

The admission

of the wall and carpet sections was therefore harmless error, and
does not justify setting Genovesi's conviction aside.15

15

The State again notes that Genovesi, or a similarly situated
home occupant, would not be bereft of any remedy for such an
improper overreaching of a consensual home search. It appears
entirely appropriate, under such circumstances and upon a proper
request, to require the offending police agency to pay for the
repairs needed to restore the home to its pre-search condition.
41

POINT TWO
THERE WAS NO SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY COGNIZABLE GROUPS FROM THE
PANEL OF PROSPECTIVE TRIAL JURORS.
Genovesi next argues that his trial jury was selected
from a panel of prospective jurors that was summoned in a manner
contrary to his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.16
To be impartial, a jury must be selected from a panel that
represents a "fair cross-section" of the community from which it
is summoned.

Tavlor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S. Ct.

692, 697-98 (1975); State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 574 (Utah
1987).

A fair cross-section panel is one from which no

constitutionally "cognizable" groups have been systematically
excluded.

Tillman, 750 P.2d at 574-75.
Cognizable groups are those that are "distinctive" in

terms of holding a unique perspective on events, or who bring
particular "qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience" to jury service.

Peters v. Kiff. 407 U.S. 493, 503,

92 S. Ct. 2163, 2169 (1972).

See James H. Druff, Comment, The

Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 Cal. L. Rev.
1555, 1561-62 (1985).

Cognizable, or distinctive groups have

been defined according to race, gender, national origin,
religion, and economic status.

See id. (citing cases).

In fact, the forty-eight prospective jurors summoned
for duty at Genovesi's trial appear to reflect an appropriate
16

Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, sets the procedure
for jury selection. Genovesi does not allege a Rule 18 violation,
but only a constitutional one.
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cross-section of various cognizable groups.

Roughly equally

divided by gender, the panel included names such as Trimble,
Samowitz, Sundquist-Valdez, Vavricek, Sorensen, Torres, Paulk,
and Thurber (R. 23-25, copied at Appendix II of this brief).

So

far as can be discerned, these names appear to reflect a variety
of at least national origins, and perhaps races and religions.
Due to a computer "glitch," however, the jury panel
contained mainly persons whose last names began with the letters
"S" and "T." Genovesi contends that persons whose last names
begin with the letters "A" through "R," largely excluded from the
panel, constitute a "distinctive" or constitutionally
"cognizable" group; the elimination of such persons from the
panel, he argues, violated his impartial jury right.

Three

federal courts of appeals have considered the argument that such
alphabetically-classified people are constitutionally cognizable:
all have rejected it.

See Walker v. Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16 (9th

Cir. 1990) (following authority from the First and Eleventh
Circuits).

Genovesi cites no contrary judicial authority.
Instead, Genovesi attempts to show "distinctiveness" in

the alphabetically excluded jurors by reference to a Dr. Trevor
Weston, who reported, in the mid-1960s, that persons whose last
names begin with the letters "S" through "Z" are fifty percent
more likely to develop "alphabetic neurosis" than are "A" through
"R" surnamed persons (Br. of Appellant at 41-42).

Nowhere does

Genovesi explain the symptoms of this alleged malady.

Further,

"alphabetic neurosis" appears nowhere in the American Psychiatric
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Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3rd Ed., Rev. 1987) (DSM III-R), a publication that
would presumably identify the malady if its overall incidence was
at all noteworthy.17
Because the DSM III-R does not recognize "alphabetic
neurosis," one may reasonably assume that it is exceedingly rare,
if it exists at all. A "fifty percent greater likelihood" of
contracting such a malady, when its overall incidence appears
negligible, is hardly significant.

Therefore, Genovesi has no

basis to assert that the panel summoned for jury duty in his case
consisted "predominantly of people with alphabetic neurosis" (Br.
of Appellant at 42).
Further, the scientific article cited by Genovesi in
support of his "alphabetic neurosis" argument actually discredits
Dr. Weston's claim.

In J. Autry & D. Barker, Academic Correlates

of Alphabetical Order of Surname, 8 J. Sch. Psychology 22 (1970)
(copied in Appendix III of this brief), three hundred students
were tested for possible correlation of academic achievement with
alphabetical order of surname.

The resulting data, scrutinized

for statistical significance, "did not support the hypothesis
that academic achievement is related to alphabetic order of
surname."

Id. at 23.

17

The Utah Legislature has adopted the current DSM as its
authority for defining mental illness. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A12-202 (Supp. 1993); see also State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280 (Utah
1988) (citing DSM-III as authority).
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Just as it would seem at first glance, then, Genovesi's
argument that the jury selection process improperly excluded
persons without "alphabetic neurosis" is fanciful. No
constitutionally cognizable group can be defined by the first
letters of individuals' last names.
Genovesi's jury selection complaint fails solely
because of his failure to identify any constitutionally
cognizable "distinctiveness" in persons whose last names begin
with letters other than "S" and "T." If this Court wishes, it
may also note that there was nothing "systematic" about the
computer "glitch" that caused the omission of such persons from
the panel of prospective jurors summoned for Genovesi's trial.
Instead, as detailed by the jury selection clerk's
testimony, the alphabetical summoning process used by the
computer in this case was an unforeseen, random event (R. 297302, copied in Addendum IV to Br. of Appellant as T. 5-10).
Nothing in the inherent design of the process was, directly or
indirectly, aimed at "alphabetical exclusion."

Compare Duren v.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366-67, 99 S. Ct. 664, 669-70 (1979)
(selection system, by purposeful design, tended to exclude women
at two critical points in panel-summoning process).

Because no

constitutionally cognizable group was excluded by any means that
might be described as "systematic," then, Genovesi's sixth
amendment-based jury selection challenge fails.
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CONCLUSION
There was no reversible error in the admission, at
trial, of evidence obtained during the searches of Genovesi's
home,

Genovesi was found guilty of manslaughter, by a jury

selected in accord with constitutional impartiality requirements.
For these reasons, Genovesi's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^£> day of July, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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APPENDIX I
Genovesi's Motion to Suppress, and Supporting Memorandum

MAY 2 9 1992
G. FRED METOS - 2250
Attorney for Defendant
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6474

Ey

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.

^IfCC^if

JASON GENOVESi,
Judge David Young
Defendant.
The defendant, Jason Genovesi, by and through his attorney of record, G. Fred
Metos, hereby moves this court to enter an order suppressing all evidence obtained
as a result of the warrantless search of the defendant's residence. Said motion is
made on the grounds and for the reason that there were neither exigent circumstances
nor consent to justify said warrantless search. Consequently, that search violated
both Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
DATED this J^Kday

of May, 1992.

G. FRED<-MET6S

Attorney for Defendant

ononsn

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this A9 day of May, 1992, to:
JAMES COPE
Deputy County Attorney
231 East Fourth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ht/A^w^~y
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G. FRED METOS - 2250
Attorney for Defendant
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6474
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

JASON GENOVESI,

:

Case No. ^ 2 - I ^ D O f e l

:

Judge David Young

Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 20, 1992, paramedics were dispatched to a residence at 5459 West
Balsa Avenue in Salt Lake County. The paramedics attended to an injured child, Gavin
Adams. Sheriff's deputies arrived and secured the residence. In the residence, the
deputies located a three year old, Justin Adams, and the eighteen year old stepfather
of the two children, Jason Genovesi.

Later that afternoon, Gavin Adams was

pronounced dead at the Pioneer Valley Memorial Hospital. On March 21, 1992,
sheriff's deputies re-entered the residence without a search warrant and without
consent to make a crime scene inspection of the residence. The officers seized hair
samples, carpet samples and cut out a piece of a wall. Measurements were also
taken in Gavin Adams' bedroom.

000041

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY
THE SEARCH.
When a life may be in danger or evidence destroyed, officers may conduct a
search without taking time to obtain a search warrant. Mincv v. Arizona. 437 U.S.
385 (1978); State v.Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). In Mincv. narcotics officers
were attempting to purchase drugs. When the officers attempted to effect an arrest,
a shootout ensued in which an undercover officer was killed. The officers initially
entered the premises to locate the gunman and persons who may be injured.
Detectives then spent four days processing the scene without a warrant. The Court
held that the police may respond to emergency of life threatening situations without
a warrant. However, the Court specifically held that " . . . a warrantless search must
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation'", 437 U.S. at
393. Similarly, in Michigan v. Tvler. 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the Court allowed fire
fighters to make a warrantless entry into a building to suppress a fire and conduct an
initial investigation after the smoke and steam had cleared. This was justified by what
was described as a " . . . compelling need for official action [when there is] no time to
secure a warrant," 436 U.S. at 509.
In State v. Ashe, supra, the court allowed narcotics officers to enter a residence
without a warrant, effect an arrest and perform a protective sweep of a residence to

-2-
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prevent the destruction or removal of evidence. In that case, agents were making a
drug purchase from a woman named Glasser. She was to sell four ounces of cocaine
for $8,500. The agent gave Glasser $500 to obtain one ounce of cocaine to inspect.
Glasser was observed by surveillance agents leaving the restaurant where the money
was received. They then watched her meet with a co-defendant, Cricks. Cricks was
followed to Ashe's residence then back to a parking lot where he met with Glasser.
Glasser then provided the cocaine to the officers. Glasser and Cricks were arrested.
Prior to that time, Glasser stated that the rest of the deal was to take place shortly
and would be conducted "at the door" of a residence. The officers went to Ashe's
residence where they observed him moving away from an upstairs window. They
were not aware of Ashe's existence or location until the transaction was in process.
The court found that the officers did not have "a realistic opportunity to secure a
warrant". Consequently, the court held that the warrantless entry fell within the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Conversely, in State v. Northruo, 256 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988), police
officers entered and searched the defendant's residence without a warrant. Money
had been given a co-defendant, he entered the residence and was arrested after
leaving. He did not have the money at the time of the arrest. The State claimed that
there were exigent circumstances because they believed that the money may be
destroyed or removed. The court of appeals recognized that preservation of evidence
is an exigent circumstance that makes a search imperative. The court also held that
-3-
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the burden of proving such a exigency is on the State. The court found that there
were no exigent circumstances in Northnip to justify the failure to obtain a warrant.
The officers knew where and when the drug transaction was to take place. There had
been two previous transactions at that location. Surveillance units were in place and
the transaction occurred when the courts were open. The co-defendant was not
expected back in the residence at the time of he was arrested.
Similarly in State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987), the Court held that
the arrest of the defendant outside of his hotel room did not justify a warrantless
entry and search of the room. In that case, hotel guests reported screaming in the
defendant's room. The victim of the assault which was charged, was located at the
manager's apartment naked and bleeding. The defendant stated he had a crazy
person in his room. The State claimed exigent circumstances justified the search.
The Court found that none were present since the defendant was outside of the room
at the time of arrest.
The search that was conducted in this case took place one day after the alleged
homicide. There were no exigencies that excused the officers' failure to obtain a
warrant. All of the persons had been rennoved from the residence and it had been
locked and secured. The evidence seized as a result of the search of the defendant's
residence must be ordered suppressed.

-4-
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POINT II
THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS NOT SEARCHED
PURSUANT TO A VOLUNTARY CONSENT.
The Supreme Court has given some general tests to determine the voluntariness
of a consent to search. In Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court
held that the mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority to search does not
constitute a voluntary consent. In that case, officers claimed to have a valid warrant
and the defendant's mother allowed them to search his room. That warrant was later
found to be invalid.
Subsequently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court
rejected the contention that before a consent may be voluntary, the person giving the
consent must know he has a right to refuse to allow officers to search. The Court
went on to hold that a consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not the result
of duress or coercion.

Voluntariness, it was held, is a question of fact to be

determined from all the circumstances. The Court described some of the factors to
be considered when applying this totality of the circumstances test. Those include:
the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in custody, the nature
of the police questioning, the environment in which the search took place, the
defendant's knowledge of his right to withhold consent and any other circumstances
that weigh on the issue of voluntariness.

-5-
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The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search has been addressed
by the Supreme Court in other contexts. The primary issues raised in United States
v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544 (1980), were whether airport authorities had illegally
stopped the defendant and if she voluntarily consented to accompany agents to an
office. The Court found that the authorities acted properly in stopping and asking the
defendant for identification. The Court went on to find that the defendant had
consented to go to the Drug Enforcement Administration office. The officers had not
kept the defendant's airline ticket or identification.

The Court found that the

defendant could reasonably interpret officers' actions to indicate that she did not have
to accompany them.
Conversely, in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983), it was held that a stop
of an individual based on less than probable cause cannot justify a detention in a small
room by two police officers. The officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket
and identification. They also had his luggage brought to the room where he was
being held. The Court found that such a situation would result in the defendant's
belief that he was under arrest. Because the defendant had not been informed that
he was free to board his plane and he actually believed he was being detained, it was
held that the encounter had lost its consensual nature. The Court went on to hold as
a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since there was no probable cause to
arrest, the search was illegal. Thus, the evidence was ordered suppressed. The Court
then made the following observations about the nature of searches based on consent:
-6-
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. . . where the validity of a search rests on consent, the
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given,
a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority.
460 U.S. at 497.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar issue in United
States v. Recalde. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985). In that case, the defendant had
been stopped for speeding in New Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license,
and the car was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran a NCIC check to
determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen. The check was negative. He then
requested assistance from a backup officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that
the defendant was transporting narcotics. The officer returned to the defendant's car
and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the ticket. When it was
signed, the officer asked the defendant to step out of the car and requested to inspect
the trunk. During the inspection, the officer found that there had been tampering with
the screws in the molding. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany
him to a nearby town. The defendant agreed to do so. At no time had the officer
returned the defendant's driver's license, vehicle registration or provided the traffic
ticket. At the police station the defendant consented to the search of the car. In
analyzing the issue of whether the trip was made with the defendant's consent, the

-7-

0U0C47

Tenth Circuit employed a three tier analysis that was later adopted by this court in
State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990). 1
In determining if there has been duress or coercion in obtaining a consent to
search, the Supreme Court of Utah has described a number of factors that should be
considered. In State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated,
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of establishing from
the totality of the circumstances that the consent was
voluntary given; however, the prosecution is not required
to prove that defendant knew of his right to refuse to
consent in order to show voluntariness. Factors which may
show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence
of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the
vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part
of the officer. [Footnote omitted]
621 P.2dat 106.
In State v. Marshall, supra, the court noted that the test for voluntariness must
be based on the totality of the circumstances of the case. To determine if a consent
is voluntary, the Utah court then adopted the Tenth Circuit's three part test2:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that
the consent was "unequivocal and specific11 and "freely and
intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied; and

1
2

That analysis will be discussed, infra.

See: United States v. Recalde. supra.
-8-
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(3) the court indulge every reasonable presumption
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that such rights were
waived.
791 P.2d at 888.
With respect to the scope of a search made pursuant to a consent, the court
in Marshall, also relied on Tenth Circuit cases. On that issue, the court stated,
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search,
the ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the
specific area agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a
consent search is limited by the breadth of the actual
consent itself . . . Any police activity that transcends the
actual scope of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth
Amendment rights of the suspect.
&. at 888.
Although the permission to search the house in this case was obtained from the
defendant's wife, the same standard of voluntariness applies.

Bumper v. North

Carolina, suora. It is expected that the evidence will show that any consent to the
search was not clear positive or unequivocal. State v. Marshall, suora. Likewise, it
is expected that the evidence will show that the consent was not free from duress or
coercion. Consequently, the evidence seized should be ordered to be suppressed.
DATED this j U . day of July, 1992.

^L^Js&L
G. FRED METOS
(
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this & day of^UtfyT 1992, to:
0

JAMES COPE
Deputy County Attorney
231 East Fourth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX II
Jury Panel Members

OF JUDGMENT RATHER THAN OF EMOTION-CHARGED REACTIONS OR
CIRCUMSTANCES.

I HOPE EVERYONE WILL BE ATTENTIVE TO THAT

REQUEST.
COUNSEL, ANYTHING FURTHER IN THAT REGARD?
MR. COPE:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

MR. METOS:

THANK YOU.

NO, YOUR HONOR.

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

I WILL BE IN BRIEF

RECESS WHILE WE CONVENE THE PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL.

YOU

MAY HAVE TO ORGANIZE THE SEATING TO DO THAT.
(RECESS).

JUDGE YOUNG:

GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR TRIAL IN THE CASE OF THE STATE
OF UTAH VERSUS JASON THOMAS GENOVESI.

THE CASE NUMBER IS

92-1900681.
ARE THE PARTIES PRESENT AND PREPARED TO PROCEED?
MR. COPE:

JAMES COPE AND KIMBERLY HORNAK

APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF UTAH.

THE STATE OF UTAH IS READY

TO PROCEED, YOUR HONOR.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. METOS:

THANK YOU.
FRED METOS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

HE'S PRESENT AND WE'RE READY TO PROCEED.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU.

THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE

BEEN SUBPOENAED HERE AS PROSPECTIVE JURORS I'LL ASK THAT
THE CLERK CALL YOUR NAME.

AS YOUR NAME IS CALLED WOULD

22
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1

YOU COME FORWARD IMMEDIATELY AND BE SEATED AT THE DIRECTION

2

OF THE BAILIFF •

1

3

THE CLERK:

4

NO. 42, TREXLER, T-R-E-X-L-E-R, RUTH DIANA;

5

NO. 23, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, GRANT;

6

NO. 9, SHRIVER, S-H-R-I-V-E-R, CYNTHIA LADD;

7

NO. 28, THACKER, T-H-A-C-K-E-R, JONI S.;

8

NO. 49, ULIBARRI, U-L-I-B-A-R-R-I, VICKIE M.;

9

NO. 4, SAMOWITZ, S-A-M-O-W-I-T-Z, SCOTT DEE;

10

NO. 35, THORNTON,. T-H-O-R-N-T-O-N, TAMARA B.;

11

NO. 31, THOMAS, T-H-O-M-A-S, KENT MADSEN;

12

NO. 20, SUNDQUIST-VALDEZ, S-U-N-D-Q-U-I-S-T HYPHEN

13

NO. 27, TERRY, T-E-R-RY, TRUDI G.;

V-A-L-D-E-Z, SALLY;

14

NO. 44, TRIPP, T-R-I-P-P, KEITH;

15

NO. 29, THATCHER, T-H-A-T-C-H-E-R, ALTON VERE;

16

NO, 24, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, JOANN LILLIAN;

17

NO. 21, TANNER, T-A-N-N-E-R, LILA JANE;

18

NO. 7, SHARP, S-H-A-R-P, SHARON CELINE;

19

NO. 12, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, GLENN C ;

20

NO. 43, TRIMBLE, T-R-I-M-B-L-E, STEPHEN A.;

21

NO. 41, TOWNER, T-O-W-N-E-R, LISA JEAN;

22

NO. 50, VAVRICEK, V-A-V-R-I-C-E-K, BONNIE L.;

23

NO. 25, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, KENNETH D.;

24

NO. 34, THOMSON, T-H-O-M-S-O-N, DANIEL L.;

25

NO. 1, DAVIES, D-A-V-I-E-S, MARK;

*

1

*

1
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22, T A R P E N N I N G , T - A - R - P - E - N - N - I - N - G ,

16, S O R E N S E N , S - O - R - E - N - S - E - N ,

GREG

SANDRA R.;

32, THOMAS, T-H-O-M-A-S, RICHARD JOSEPH;
*f0, T O R R E S , T - O - R - R - E - S , PAUL
18, STEADMAN,

LOVATO;

S-T-E-A-D-M-A-N,

KAREN H.;

26, T A Y L O R , T - A - Y - L - O - R , M I C H A E L JON;
30, T H E U R E R , T - H - E - U - R - E - R ,
2, JENSEN, J-E-N-S-E-N,

CAROL

MUIR;

SHELLY ANN;

ltf, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, V I R G I N I A

RUTH;

15, S O R E N S E N , S - O - R - E - N - S - E - N ,

MARCE

11, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H,

AIKEN;

E L I Z A B E T H T.;

4 7 , T U T T L E , T - U - T - T - L - E , SAMUEL E . ;
*f6, T U C K E R , T - U - C - K - E - R ,
8, SHERMAN,

T O D D MARTIN;

S-H-E-R-M-A-N,

LYNNE P.;

10, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, DONNA K R E M E R S ;
13, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, HOWARD

LUCIEN;

5, SARA, S-A-R-A, STEVEN C ;
48, TWINTING, T-W-I-N-T-I-N-G,

KARLA

NIELSEN;

3, PAULK, P-A-U-L-K, KAREN M.;
19, STECK, S-T-E-C-K, D A V I D K E I T H ;
38, TINGEY, T-I-N-G-E-Y,

GARY;

37, THURBER, T-H-U-R-B-E-R,
39,
6,

CAROLYN

TORGERSEN, T - O - R - G - E - R - S - E - N ,
SHARP, S - H - A - R - P ,

LOCKETT;

BONNIE;

JAMES;

2h
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1

I

NO. 33, THOMAS, T-H-O-M-A-S, TAMARA;

2

'

NO. 17, SORENSON, S-O-R-E-N-S-O-N, EILEEN.

3
4

JUDGE YOUNG:
I NOW

5
6

7

AS PROSPECTIVE JURORS, WILL YOU STAND TOGETHER AND

RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND AND RECEIVE AN OATH FROM THE CLERK?
I

CWHEREUPON, THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE SWORN
IN).

8
9

ALL OF YOU WHO HAVE BEEN SEATED

JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU.

AND YOU MAY EACH BE

SEATED.

10

THE INITIAL PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR A JURY

11

TRIAL IS TO INQUIRE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS OF FACTS THAT

12

MAY BE HELPFUL FOR COUNSEL TO SELECT AN APPROPRIATE PANEL

13

FOR THE JURY.

I WANT TO SAY TO YOU, FIRST OF ALL, THAT

14

| I THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONDING TO THE REQUEST OF THE COURT

15

| TO COME FORWARD AND TO PROSPECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THIS

16

' JURY.

I KNOW THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO SO COME IS NOT AT

17

A MOST CONVENIENT* TIME FOR YOU.

18

CIRCUMSTANCES ARE OTHER THAN YOU MIGHT PREFER TO BE HERE.

19

BUT I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING.

20

I KNOW THAT YOUR LIFE AND

THIS CASE IS A MURDER CASE.

THE DEFENDANT IN

21

THIS CASE IS ACCUSED OF HAVING KILLED A TWO AND A HALF YEAR

22

OLD STEPSON ON MARCH 20TH, 1992 IN A RESIDENCE IN KEARNS.

23

AS WE BEGIN PRELIMINARILY INQUIRING OF EACH OF

24

YOU—WELL, LET ME SAY REGARDING THAT FACTUAL STATEMENT,

25

DURING THE COURSE OF THESE INQUIRIES OF YOU THERE MAY COME

25
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APPENDIX III
Academic Correlates of Alphabetical Order of Surname
8 J. Sch. Psychology 22 (1970)
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ACADEMIC CORRELATES OF ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF SURNAME
JOSEPH W. AUTRY
D O N A L D G. BARKER
Tarkton State College

Texas A&M University

Summary: This study was suggested by Weston's contention that alphabetic position of surname might be a significant independent variable affecting human characteristics. Using
the 306 twelfth grade students of a heterogeneous high school as a sample, correlation coefficients were computed to indicate the degree of relationship between alphabetical order of
surname and each of eleven variables of the Iowa Test of Educational Development Correlations were generally of a direction indicating higher achievement associated with students
whose last names be^an with the letters toward the beginning of the alphabet, but most of
these were not statistically significant

In an Associated Press release
(1967), Dr. Trevor Weston was reirted to have described to the British
edical Association a condition he
called "alphabetic neurosis." According
to the newspaper account, Weston
found in a ten vear survey of mortality
statistics a t ; xmdon teaching hospital
that the ir ir ace of neurosis was D0%
higher an: . persons whose last names
began wit :AC letters "S" through "Z"
than ami - those whose last names began with tfie letters "A" through "R."
Weston (1965) further found that individuals in die S-Z group were twice
as prone as others to ulcers and three
times more likely to undergo heart attacks. In personal correspondence,
Weston (1967) classified his paper on
"alphabetic neurosis" as a presentation
of a hypothesis supported <by preliminary investigation rather than as a
completed research project. He attributed the adverse effects of a name beS'nning near the end of the alphabet to
e constant strain of waiting for one's
name to be reached in the classroom
and in other situations.
Weston's work (1965) suggested to
the authors that alphabetic order of
surname might be associated with academic achievement as well as with
physical and mental health. This study
is a partial test of that hypothesis.
Subjects. The subjects of this study
were the 306 twelfth grade students of
a comprehensive high school which
draws students from all sectors of a
small city in central Texas. They were

G

approximately evenly divided between
boys (158) and girls (148).
PROCEDURE

Within each sex, the subjects* last
names were listed alphabetically and
ranked ordinally, with the names nearest the beginning of the alphabet ranked lowest and those nearest the end
ranked highest The ranks thus assigned were treated as measures of
alphabetic order. No attempt was made
to transform these to other than a rectilinear distribution.
The subtest scores of the Iowa Test
of Educational Development (1963)
were available for each subject and
were used as the measures of academic
achievement The following variables
of the ITED were considered: social
studies background, science background, correctness of expression,
quantitative thinking, social studies
reading, science reading, literary reading, average of reading tests, general
vocabulary, comprehensive achievement, ana use of sources.
Alphabetic order was correlated with
each of these ITED measures, using the
product-moment coefficient of correlation. According to DuBois (1965), the
derivation of the formula for the
product-moment correlation coefficient
makes no assumption regarding the
shapes of the distributions correlated,
except when applying the standard error of estimate in specific instances of
prediction. The correlation analysis was
perfonned separately for the sample of

ACADEMIC CORRELATES

158 boys and the sample of 148 girls
Correlations with absolute values beyond 0.16 were considered indicative
of relationships significantly different
from independence or zero relationships.
RESULTS \ N D DISCUSSION

The coefficients of correlation of alphabetic order of surname with the
various measures of academic achievement for both groups are displayed in
Table 1. Positive correlations indicate
Table 1
Academic Correlates of Alphabetic
Order of Surname
Variable

Correlation with Alphabetic
Order of Surname
Bon

Girl*

< * - ? » ) W -148)
Social studies background -0.01
-0.13
Science background
.0.12
-0.19«
Correctness of expression -0.02
-0.07
Quantitative thinking
-0.02
-0.09
Reading: social studies
0.02
-0.10
Reading: science
.0.05
•0.06
Reading: literary materials 0.00
-0.13
Reading: average
-0.01
-0.10
General vocabulary
.0,05
•0.07
Comprehensive achievement -0.04
-0.12
Use of sources
.0.06 % -0.08
•Significant beyond 0.05 level of confidence

23
was 0.02, and one 0.00), but only one
was significantly different from zero,
beyond the 0.05 level of confidence. All
the correlations of alphabetic order
with achievement were negative in the
analysis of the data for girls; and, in
every case, the correlation was "more
negative" in the data for girls than in
those for boys.
The correlation data did not generally permit rejecting the null hypotheses of zero correlations and therefore
did not support the hypothesis that
academic achievement is related to alphabetic order of surname. Most of the
correlations, however, were of such a
direction as to suggest a tendency toward higher achievement by students
whose names begin nearer ithe beginning of the alphabet, especially in the
case of the data for girls.
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